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A framework for analysing worker participation 
in management 
R. J. Stephens* 
The leve.ls of .managerial decision-making at ·which worker participation occurs, the 
range of subject-matter covered, the .degree of power-sharing, and the means by which 
worker participation is implem.ented, are influe.nced by the wider social, economic and 
political environment. 
Introduction 
New Zealand is not alone in envisaging that organised forms of worker participation in 
management will represent one part of the solution to the problems of low profitability., 
slow rates of economic and productivity growth, industrial unr·est and employee motiva-
tion. For these reasons the New Zealand Employers' Federation {1977) advocated great~er 
employee involvement in the workplace, but its managerial bias influenced its recommend-
ations on the appropriate form and cont·ent of worker participation. Trott (1977) and 
Public Service Association (1978) see more extensive and increased worker influence on 
management decisions arising out of developments in colle ~ctive bargaining. Given these 
divergent views, the fmdings of the N~ew Zealand Department of Labour (1972, 1976), 
analysed by Smith (1979), of th·e limited coverage and success of the organised schemes 
for worker participation seem unsurprising. The intention of this article is to provide an 
analytical framework which can be used to determine the stru~cture of worker participation 
most suited to the New Z·ealand environment. 
Worker Participation in Management Defmed 
Worker participation in management is a system of joint decision-making or rule formu-
lation, and will occur whenever the workforc·e affects the process of decision-making 
beyond that implicit in the job content. Thus worker participation represents a challenge 
by employees, and for their representative organisations to unilateral managerial authority. 
It is an assertion of authority not based on the power of property ownership. The desire 
for participation arises when the managerial goals of profits and enterprise growth which 
require efficiency in the deployment of labour conflict with employ~ee aspirations and 
customs concerning that d·eployment. -
Participation in management can take several fonns: 
(1) Unorganised participation, which may take the form of a negative response to 
management decisions via a strike or restrictive labour practice, or it may covert, as 
in the development of 'custom and practice' rules (Brown, 1973) whereby employees 
erode managerial prerogatives and widen the degree of work-discretion, or alter the 
effort-pay bargain. 
(2) Organised participation, which refers to formal and mutually agreed schemes such as 
joint consultation, autonomous work groups, and worker directors, with the extent, 
~ 
natur·e and area of joint control specified. 
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(3) Collective bargaining, which provides a procedural mechanism by ~hich employees' 
views are heard, and when coupled with the threat of unorganised forms of participa-
tion, can successfully influence the direction of managerial decisions. Participation is 
by opposition, providing negative responses as the only option, and an absence of 
responsibility for decisions made. 
The issue is often perceived as how to tum unorganised participation into an organised 
form. But at the heart of many organised schemes is an attempt by management to regain 
control over the procel.s of decision-making, or to unite employee aspirations with those of 
management. These schemes could be classified as pseudo-participative, being highly prag-
matic and manipulative, rather than recognizing that employees and employers sometimes 
have legitimate but divergent interests which require reconciliation by a properly 
constituted decision-sharing process. 
The Structure of Worker Participation in Management 
The appropriate form and content of worker participation in management is influenced 
by the environment in which the industrial relations system is set. This environment is 
continually evolving as economic circumstances, aspirations and objectives, the political 
climate and legislation all alter. For instance, the 19 73 Industrial Relations Act which 
pennitted collective bargaining and workplace procedures to precede and supplement 
conciliation and arbitration has led to an increased dependence upon direct decision-
making by the industrial relations actors which is an essential prerequisite for organised 
schemes of worker participation. Or, the tightening economic circumstances facing each 
enterprise requires management to increase efficiency to achieve its profit objectives, and 
the increase in efficiency may only be forthcoming if discussed with and agreed to by the 
employees, rather than unilaterally imposed by management. Similarly, technological and 
market conditions which are important influences on industrial behaviour, degree of job 
discretion, th,e organisational structure, the size, stability and nature of the workforce and 
workplace, the appropriate payments system and hours of work (Walker, 1970) will require 
continuous scrutiny in determining what is the appropriate form of worker participation 
for each enterprise. 
These environmental factors only provide the outer framework for a system of worker 
participation; its actual structure will require detailed analysis and discussion of the 
following points: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
the rights of workers to participate in management functions which may stem from 
legal enactment, be formally written into industry or company agreements, be 
infonnally agreed at firm or plant level, or, with unorganised participation be in 
contravention of recognised decision-making channels. Obviously legislation will 
provid~e the widest coverage and uniformity in the foun of work~er participation, but 
is more likely to be at variance with the specific economic and technical aspects of 
an enterprise, or with managerial and employee aspirations. Company agreements 
can be more related to the circumstances of an enterprise but are more difficult to 
enforce and hence less likely to obtain widespread coverage. 
the level of decision-making at which worker participation in management occurs. 
Ascending participation (Walker, 1975), whereby employees exert some influence 
on n1anagerial functions above their own level of discretion, allows e1nployees to 
influence fundarnental policy decisions and the overall direction of the enterprise. 
Descending participation involves the sharing of managerial decisions at the level of 
the employee, i.e. the decisions which directly affect th~e discretion over the 
• 
e1nployee's task. 
-
areas of control or joint decision-1naking in ascending participation can relate to 
issues of allocation of resources, production policy, labour relations, finance, pricing 
a . 
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and marketing policies. The appointment of worker-directors over some or all these 
areas will not eliminate the conflict between shareholder and e.mployee inter~ests: 
at best they will institutionalise the conflict. Descending participation incorporates 
autonomous work groups and shop-floor works councils, and is likely to cover the 
practical aspects of policy implementation, te~chnical matters such as job and equip-
ment design, the deployment of labour, pace of work, and th~e day-to-day production 
planning and control. 
(iv) the degree of worker control, or the ~extent of intrusion by the workforce into 
managerial pr~erogatives, implies a continuum of worker power ranging from th~e right 
to re ~ceive infor1nation through to the right to protest, to suggestion, to prior 
consultation, to bargaining, to veto which may b~e either temporary and management 
must negotiate, or be final, to co-de~cision, and finally to unilateral workers' 
decisions. It is possible to have different degrees of power over each level and type of 
decision. 
The Means to Implement a Scheme for Worker Participation 
Th~ere are a variety of alternative participatory schemes, often interlocking rather than 
mutually exclusive, operating at different levels of the enterprise, and having varying 
amounts of power over a range of topics. It is feasible to have unions and management 
involved at governmental level discussing the level of employin~ent, health and safety regula-
tions, etc.; to have worker-directors having the power of veto over specific issues of labour 
relations, with worker control over the organisation and pace of work in autonomous work 
groups, whilst management retains authority over the state of technology, material 
ordering and marketing policies which are then subjected to unorganised forms of 
participation. ~Only when the network of participatory institutions has been determined 
can the means for implementation of the schemes be decided. 
The crucial issue for implementation is that the preferred nature, extent and scope of 
control must be jointly detennined by those operating the scheme. Schemes introduced 
unilaterally by management, or imposed by law or statute, are likely to fail through apathy 
of th~e workforce, or insufficient flexibility for the specific industrial relations system of an 
~enterprise. 
The workforce and trade union organisation face a range of issues which need resolution 
before implementation: 
(i) In large scale organisations with ascending participation, how are the workers' repre-
sentatives to be chosen? This relates to more than just the method of election, but 
also to wh~ether elections are restricted to trade union members or to the whole 
workforce; on what bases are the craft, unskilled and white-collar groups to be 
represented (and how are their sometimes divergent interests to be combined and 
reconciled?); and at what level in the organisation do workers become management? 
(ii) Once elected, what powers do th~e workers have over th~eir representatives? This 
relates partly to th~e regularity of elections and the right of recall of th~eir representa-
tives, but also to the degr~ee of independence which their representative has in making 
decisions. Management will have little confidence in a workers' representative who is 
continuously subject to recall and replacement. If, however .. the workers' r~epresenta­
tives develop the expertise to participate effectively in decisions, their attitud~es may 
~change so that they no longer adequately represent the workers. 
(iii) What are the rights of the workers if th~ey disagree with the decision which their 
elected representative participated in? Are they able to indulge in industrial conflict 
against their 'own decision'? To allow a trade union to call a strike will require 
separation of the trade union from th~e participatory body and the election procedure. 
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(iv) How are the elected representatives going to disseminate information to their con-
s~ituents •. an~ to ass~ss the consensus of opinions of their constituents for representa-
tion? This will requtre the establishment of regular workplace meetings, as well as 
provision for ,a,d hoc meetings for special decisions. 
(v) What is the relationship between the trade union movement and the participatory 
bodies? Trade union power may be reduced if individual workers gain greater auton-
omy by directly negotiating over their working conditions rather than relying upon 
the union. If trade union power is thus weakened at plant level, officials may wish to 
compensate in substantive bargaining. The split between substantive and procedural 
issues may become unstabilising if carried out by separate bodies. 
Both management and employees will require training in the nature and methods of the 
participatory process. Management at all levels will have to adapt to a new role status and 
command hierarchy, and have to accept a pluralistic framework. The participatory 
committee ·will have to determine:-
(i) What is the proportion of workers' representatives on the committee? This will 
obviously influence the degree of power which the workers will have. 
(ii) By what method shall the committee make a decision? Is it to be a consensus, which 
implies a degree of flexibility by the decision-makers, or by majority, which implies 
that the workers' representatives may be outvoted? 
(iii) In ascending participation what is to be the relationship between the representatives 
and middle management as middle management may be by-passed in the information 
and decision network? 
Conclusions 
In all enterprises decisions have to be made concerning the planning, organisation and 
control of production and distribution. Under present company law these decisions are 
taken in the interests of the shareholders, which higher levels of management perceive to 
be profits and growth. Employee motivation, it is assumed, flows from a mix of extrinsic 
satisfactions plus negative sanctions such as the power of dismissal. But some managerial 
decisions have an adverse impact upon the workers' perceptions of their own interests. 
Where these interests have a high priority, employees may invoke their own sanctions in 
the form of strikes or go-slows, or insert their own norms. Appeals to managerial authority 
will be rejected unless employees perceive that their interests are not disadvantaged by the 
decision. 
From this stance, worker participation in management provides a method for making 
decisions which are acceptable to both management and employees. Management can 
accept this intrusion into their prerogatives from pragmatic points of view: it may enable 
th·e.m to regain some control over areas of decision-making; or it may increase profits from 
a change in ·employee motivation or a reduction in industrial conflict. Employees will 
desire participation wherever the arbitrary use of power by management results in decisions 
at variance with their interests. The introduction of an organised system of participation 
will take cognisance of these factors, influencing the industrial relations system of ~each 
enterprise, and will require detailed negotiation between all levels of management and 
employees ov~r the areas and levels for shared decision-making, and the degree of power 
to be accord·ed to the workforce. 
In the New Zealand context, the present array of participatory schemes, and their 
success, is lin1ited. The degree of unorganised participation has indicated a desire by 
workers to influence management decisions, whilst the trade union n1ovement has seen 
collective bargaining as a means of Curth·er intruding into managerial prerogatives. In 
gen~eraJ, managein~ent has a unitary perspective, but the increased need to resolve industrial 
relations problems at th~e workplace due to the impact of technological change and 
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